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Impact of Inter- and Intra-Regional Coordination in
Markets With a Large Renewable Component
Stefanos Delikaraoglou, Student Member, IEEE, Juan M. Morales, Member, IEEE, and
Pierre Pinson, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—The establishment of the single European day-ahead
market has accomplished a crucial step towards the spatial inte-
gration of the European power system. However, this new arrange-
ment does not consider any intra-regional coordination of day-
ahead and balancing markets and thus may become counterpro-
ductive or inefﬁcient under uncertain supply, e.g., from weather-
driven renewable power generation. In the absence of a speciﬁc
target model for the common balancing market in Europe, we in-
troduce a framework to compare different coordination schemes
andmarket organizations. The proposed models are formulated as
stochastic equilibrium problems and compared against an optimal
market setup. The simulation results reveal signiﬁcant efﬁciency
loss in case of partial coordination and diversity of market struc-
ture among regional power systems.
Index Terms—Market coupling, TSO coordination, stochastic
complementarity models, generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE),
electricity markets.
NOTATION
A. Indices and sets:
Set of regions
Set of system buses
Set of dispatchable units
Set of wind power units
Set of transmission lines
Set of wind power scenarios
Set of dispatchable units located at bus
Set of wind power units located at bus
Set of buses located in region
Set of dispatchable units located in region
B. Parameters:
Demand at node [MW]
Day-ahead offer price of unit [$/MWh]
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Up regulation offer price of unit [$/MWh]
Down regulation offer price of unit [$/MWh]
Value of involuntarily shed load [$/MWh]
Capacity of dispatchable unit [MW]
Capacity of wind power unit [MW]
Forecast mean of wind power production [MW]
Wind power realization in scenario [MW]
Probability of occurrence of scenario
Maximum up regulation provided by unit [MW]
Maximum down regulation provided by unit
[MW]
Maximum capacity of line [MW]
Absolute value of the susceptance of line
[p.u.]
Relative valuation of line by operator
C. Variables:
Voltage angle at node at the day-ahead stage [rad]
Voltage angle at node in scenario [rad]
Day-ahead schedule of dispatchable unit [MW]
Day-ahead schedule of wind power unit [MW]
Up reserve capacity scheduled for unit [MW]
Down reserve capacity scheduled for unit [MW]
Up regulation provided by unit in scenario
[MW]
Down regulation provided by unit in scenario
[MW]
Wind power spilled by unit in scenario [MW]
Load shedding at node in scenario [MW]
Variables augmented with the superscript represent the deci-
sions of the operator in charge of the corresponding region. The
symbols denote the valuation of the arbitrary resource
by operators A and B, respectively. Similarly, denote
the subset of system resources located in the corresponding re-
gions A and B.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE last years have seen a substantial restructuring ofthe European power system regarding both the genera-
tion portfolio and the market architecture. Renewable energy
sources (RES) have gained a leading role on the supply-side,
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2 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS
while the establishment of the Internal Electricity Market
(IEM) pursued the spatial integration of the regional day-ahead
markets. This inter-regional integration of day-ahead markets
has enabled access to a larger pool of generating resources and
exploits the arbitrage opportunities over the European network
to optimize social welfare through enhanced cross-border
competition and improved market liquidity. According to
the ‘Target Model’ for the European market integration,
day-ahead clearing follows a zonal pricing scheme, where
transmission capacity among zones is calculated according to
either ﬂow-based methods in case of highly meshed grids and
strong interdependencies between the interconnections or the
Available Transfer Capacity (ATC) approach for less meshed
networks [1]. This reduced grid representation, where internal
network is treated as a copper plate, may result into infeasible
real-time power ﬂows due to transmission congestion. Never-
theless, recent literature [2], [3] proposes alternative approaches
to account also for the intra-zonal network feasibility, based on
a centralized market-splitting algorithm that integrates diverse
market designs, i.e., power pools or power exchanges.
Despite the spatial coupling of day-ahead markets operated
by power exchanges, balancing operation remains still a respon-
sibility of regional Transmission System Operators (TSOs).
During real-time operation, TSOs must take corrective actions
to guarantee network feasibility and cover any imbalances from
the initial schedule. This geographically segmented design
hinders access to cheaper cross-border balancing resources
and thus it aggravates the scope for exercising market power
in cases of low market liquidity. Moreover, internal balancing
resources might be over-utilized since some potential gains
from reduced prediction errors due to spatial smoothing effects
of stochastic in-feed are not leveraged. In this respect, [4]
shows that the integration of the Nordic and German balancing
markets can reduce annual costs up to €400 million, while [5]
estimates a reduction of balancing costs up to 50% from the
establishment of a common merit-order list between the Dutch,
German and Nordic markets. In addition, [6] reports 40% less
re-dispatch in the integrated Northern European power market
in case of system-wide regulating reserve procurement as well
as 25% reduction in reserves activation due to system-wide
netting of imbalances. A similar analysis is performed in [7],
showing a potential cost reduction of 40% by the implementa-
tion of a cross-border balancing mechanism between Belgium
and the Netherlands. On the European level, [8] estimates the
beneﬁts from balancing market integration to €1.3 billion per
year due to potential imbalance netting and exchange of lower
cost balancing power.
Apart from the limited coordination in space, the sequential
operation of the current market architecture does not allow
for any inter-temporal hedging to deal with the increasing
uncertainty of variable and partially predictable RES, e.g.,
wind power, resulting in diminished overall market efﬁ-
ciency. In order to enable the coupling of day-ahead and
balancing market stages, recent research [9]–[12] focuses
on market-clearing models that jointly optimize day-ahead
dispatch and real-time reserve deployment within a stochastic
programming framework. This integrated approach is able to
capture the dependency of balancing actions on day-ahead
decisions and thus reduce total operating costs.
Nonetheless, the implementation of an ideal market design,
which integrates energy and transmission both in time and
space, requires a pan-European market operator/TSO that has
full information on the spatio-temporal structure of forecast
errors and a complete overview of the system. However, re-
gional TSOs are hesitant to forfeit some of their autonomy to
a central authority given the signiﬁcant differences that exist
in balancing operations, control concepts and local resources.
In the absence of a speciﬁc target model for the integration
of regional balancing markets, different market arrangements
with varying levels of harmonization and coordination between
TSOs may arise before the establishment of a pan-European
balancing market [13]. A comprehensive study on the different
design elements in six short-term, i.e., intraday and real-time,
European power markets is presented in [14]. In this regard,
generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) problems provide a nat-
ural framework to model the interaction of players that share
a common strategy set. For instance, [15] formulates a GNE
model to study different degrees of coordination in congestion
management among neighboring TSOs. This model is applied
on an illustrative power system in [16], [17] showing the
detrimental effects of partial coordination and market incom-
pleteness on re-dispatching costs, while [18] follows a similar
approach to study the effect of imperfect coordination among
the four German TSOs which results in expensive remedial
actions.
This paper aims at appraising the beneﬁts from the
spatio-temporal coupling of the European electricity markets
compared to plausible decentralized organizations with imper-
fect coordination among neighboring regions. In this regard, we
provide a methodological framework to model varying levels
of coordination both in space and in time based on a stochastic
mixed complementarity problem (MCP) formulation. The pro-
posed framework can accommodate several features of possible
market arrangements such as limited access to cross-border
balancing resources and different valuation of the shared trans-
mission capacity. In light of an inefﬁcient energy-only market
in case of partial coordination, we propose a remedial reserve
capacity mechanism that brings the market outcome close to
the ideal setup of full coordination.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II de-
scribes the different degrees of intra- and inter-regional coor-
dination and their modeling approach from an economic and
mathematical perspective, while the detailed model formulation
is provided in Section III. Section IV presents and discusses re-
sults of an illustrative case study performed on a stylized six-bus
electricity system. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. BASIC COORDINATION CONCEPTS
In this work, we study the impact of different degrees of co-
ordination both in time (intra-regional) and in space (inter-re-
gional) domains, as shown in Fig. 1.
On the temporal dimension ofmarket operation, wemodel the
extreme cases of imperfect and full intra-regional coordination
by employing a sequential and a stochastic integrated market-
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Fig. 1. Intra- and inter-regional coordination arrangements. DA: Day-ahead
market. BA: Balancing market.
clearing approach, respectively. The sequential setup resembles
the existing European market architecture, where a day-ahead
auction takes place 12–36 hours prior to actual energy delivery
to produce an initial schedule for generation and consumption
levels. To cope with any real-time energy imbalances, an in-
dependent balancing market is organized for the activation of
regulating power. This mechanism perceives a completely de-
terministic view of the uncertainties involved in power system
operation, e.g., stochastic wind power generation, and thus it
prevents any intra-regional coordination between the day-ahead
and balancing trading ﬂoors. On the contrary, a market-clearing
model which co-optimizes the energy dispatch and the antici-
pated reserve deployment with a fully probabilistic view of un-
certainty, attains perfect intra-regional coordination. Nonethe-
less, this market setup suffers from a fundamental design ﬂaw:
marginal prices do not always guarantee cost recovery for ﬂex-
ible producers [10], [19]. Hence, the application of this market
architecture here is purely instrumental and used only for the
deﬁnition of an optimal benchmark for intra-regional coordina-
tion.
In the inter-regional domain, full spatial coordination is
achieved when regional operators1 cooperate to jointly optimize
their systems, offering all their resources in a common pool
and exchanging complete information about their domestic
network. On the other hand, imperfect coordination between
multiple operators may arise in form of partial quantity or price
coordination. Partial quantity coordination emerges in case
of a segmented market of cross-border resources, i.e., when
some internal resources are excluded from the common pool,
as shown in Fig. 1, where only a subset of resources is
offered in the common market, e.g., due to different reliability
criteria. Throughout this work, we consider that all system
resources are accessible from all regional operators during the
day-ahead stage, following the paradigm of the European In-
ternal Electricity Market. On the contrary, we apply the concept
of partial quantity coordination on the balancing stage, where
each operator can access only the subset of system resources
that are physically located in its region.
1We couple the entities of market operator and TSO under the term ‘operator’,
despite their distinguished scope pertaining to the day-ahead and balancing mar-
kets, respectively.
Another source of imperfect coordination is market incom-
pleteness [20]. A complete market suggests that all constraints
are traded at a single price which reﬂects the common valua-
tion of each product from all agents. However, in case of partial
price coordination (or a completely missing market for some
services), agents with different willingness to pay for a certain
resource face a price gap due to lack of arbitrage opportunities
that prevent price convergence [21]. For example, in Fig. 1 the
arbitrary resource (e.g., a transmission line or generation ca-
pacity) is valued at different prices from each oper-
ator. This leads to a Pareto-inefﬁcient resource allocation since
all agents could improve their payoff by jointly optimizing their
decisions [22].
From an economic perspective, imperfect coordination
among various players relates to the notion of GNE. This is
the equilibrium of a non-cooperative game where both the
payoff and the set of each player's constraints depends on rival
players' actions. In the context of power systems, operators
in adjacent regions interact on their strategy sets through the
shared physical constraints imposed by the underlying network
and the limits of the available resources.
From a mathematical viewpoint, a GNE problem leads to a
Quasi-Variational Inequality (QVI) model which, in the general
case, admits multiple solutions that arise from different valu-
ation of the shared constraints, i.e., each agent may have dif-
ferent dual variables for each shared constraint. In order to ob-
tain a numerically tractable solution, the original QVI problem
is reduced to a Variational Inequality (VI) problem, using the
solution concept of normalized equilibrium [23]. Finally, this
VI problem can be recast as an equivalent MCP as described in
Section III.
Similar methods to explore the multiple solutions to QVI
problems are proposed in [24], whereas [25] formulates an it-
erative algorithm based on disjunctive constraints to identify
different equilibria, at the expense, though, of higher computa-
tional cost. The normalized equilibrium technique is also used in
[26] to analyze cooperative game theory in the context of elec-
tricity markets as well as in [27] for the analysis of renewable
portfolio standards in the presence of coupling regulatory con-
straints among different electricity producers.
III. MODELING INTRA- AND INTER-REGIONAL COORDINATION
A. Assumptions
The mathematical formulation of market-clearing models
(1)–(2) and (3) build on the following set of assumptions.
1) The only source of uncertainty considered is stochastic
wind power generation while system load and ‘ﬁrm’ re-
source availability can be perfectly forecast. However, ad-
ditional uncertainties such as demand variations or equip-
ment failures can be integrated in the market-clearing in a
similar way.
2) Stochastic wind power production is modeled by a ﬁnite
set of scenarios. This probabilistic information is centrally
obtained by the operator to capture the spatial dependence
structure of the forecast errors. In addition, we assume ac-
cess to the correct description of the predictive densities
of stochastic power production, i.e., there is no mismatch
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between the ‘estimated’ and the ‘realized’ distributions of
wind energy generation. We leave the topic of forecast im-
perfection for future research.
3) Demand-side is assumed to be completely inelastic, with
a sufﬁciently large value of lost load. Hence, the social
welfare maximization is equivalent to minimization of the
power system operational cost.
4) The day-ahead market is settled on independent hourly
single-period auctions and thus no inter-temporal con-
straints, e.g., ramping rates, are taken into account.
Nonetheless, ramping constraints can be incorporated
in the proposed framework, extending the formulation
to a multi-period setup. In addition, no intra-day energy
trading is considered, justiﬁed by the low liquidity of these
markets [28].
5) The transmission network is modeled with a lossless DC
approximation.
6) Assuming null power production costs, the price offer and
the spillage cost of wind power is set equal to zero.
7) In accordance with the European market paradigm,
conventional generators internalize any discrete on-off
commitment decisions and we further assume that they
offer their full capacity into the market with linear cost
functions. This preserves the linear and convex formula-
tion of the market-clearing models and permits to integrate
the market-clearing models in a complementarity problem
through their Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions.
In the subsequent formulations, the vector of dual variables
associated with each set of constraints is indicated after a colon.
For the sake of clarity, we use the symbols and , with ap-
propriate indices, to denote the duals of inequality and equality
constraints, respectively.
B. Intra-Regional Coordination
1) Sequential Market (SeqM): The sequential market setup
comprises the day-ahead and balancing trading ﬂoors which are
cleared independently by solving models (1) and (2), respec-
tively. The operator determines the optimal day-ahead dispatch
through the following optimization problem.
Ξ
(1a)
(1b)
(1c)
(1d)
(1e)
(1f)
(1g)
where Ξ is the set of primal opti-
mization variables of the day-ahead market-clearing problem.
The objective function (1a) represents the day-ahead cost of
power system operation to be minimized. The equality con-
straint (1b) enforces the power balance at every node of the
system. Constraints (1c) represent the capacity limits of conven-
tional generators, while constraints (1d) set the upper bound to
wind power dispatch equal to the conditional expectation of the
wind power stochastic process. The power ﬂows over the net-
work are restricted by the transmission capacity limits in (1e)
and equation (1f) ﬁxes the voltage angle at the reference node
equal to zero. Finally, constraints (1g) are variable declarations.
In real-time operation, when the uncertainty realization
is known, any deviations from the day-ahead schedule have to
be balanced by appropriate re-dispatch actions given as the so-
lution of the following optimization problem.
Ξ
(2a)
(2b)
(2c)
(2d)
(2e)
(2f)
(2g)
(2h)
(2i)
(2j)
(2k)
where Ξ is
the set of primal optimization variables of the balancing market-
clearing problem. Notice that all the day-ahead variables enter
the problem as parameters. The re-dispatch actions, i.e., up- and
down-regulation, wind spillage and load shedding constitute the
set of available regulation services. The objective function (2a)
to be minimized is the cost of re-dispatch actions in order to
re-establish the nodal power balance enforced by constraints
(2b). Constraints (2c) and (2d) bind the up and down reserve ac-
tivation from every conventional unit according to its capacity
and the day-ahead dispatch, while constraints (2e) and (2f) en-
force the corresponding offer limits speciﬁed by each generator
for up- and down-regulation, respectively. Similarly, the re-dis-
patch actions of wind spillage and load shedding are bounded by
the actual wind power production and the nodal demand through
(2g) and (2h), respectively. Constraints (2i) guarantee the net-
work feasibility after the deployment of reserves and equation
(2j) ﬁxes the voltage angle of the reference node to zero. The
variable declarations of model (2) are included in the set of con-
straints (2k).
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2) Stochastic Integrated Market (StochM): The stochastic
integrated market is formulated as a two-stage stochastic pro-
gramming problem (3) in which day-ahead dispatch decisions
anticipate the balancing recourse actions over a plausible range
of uncertainty. For the sake of brevity, we present a compact
formulation of model (3) emphasizing its main differences com-
pared to the sequential approach.
Ξ
(3a)
(3b)
(3c)
(3d)
where Ξ
is the set of primal optimization variables
of the stochastic integrated market model. Unlike the conven-
tional dispatch model (1)–(2), which separates completely the
day-ahead and balancing operations, the stochastic integrated
market accounts for the interaction of these stages through the
expectation of the balancing costs in the objective function (3a)
and the real-time constraints (3d). Notice that real-time con-
straints are formulated for all , whereas the day-ahead dis-
patch decisions enter the set of (3d) as variables instead of ﬁxed
parameters. This implicit link between the two stages permits to
pre-position, even out of merit-order, the ﬂexible resources in a
way that improves the overall response to variations and un-
certainty of stochastic generation. Moreover, observe that, the
day-ahead dispatch of stochastic generation may take values
within the whole interval of the installed capacity (constraint
(3c)) depending on the structure of forecast errors and the asym-
metry of regulating costs.
C. Inter-Regional Coordination
To study different degrees of inter-regional coordination, we
consider a multi-regional power system where each region
is managed by an independent operator. In this setup, full co-
ordination is achieved when all operators cooperate in order to
minimize the total system cost by fully sharing the resources
and technical information of their jurisdiction both in the day-
ahead and real-time stages. In practice, this setup is equivalent
to a fully centralized organization where market-clearing is per-
formed by a single entity. However, a decentralized organiza-
tional structure, where each regional operator seeks to mini-
mize its own internal system cost, may not fulﬁll the prereq-
uisites of the above ideal paradigm. Following the discussion of
Section II, this operational scheme is modeled as a stochastic
MCP, where the KKT conditions for each operator's optimiza-
tion problem are simultaneously solved. This modeling frame-
work allows to consider regional operators that follow either
similar or different market designs, in particular the ‘naive’ se-
quential approach or the ‘smart’ stochastic integrated market-
clearing. The complete formulation of KKT optimality condi-
tions is provided in the Appendix.
We ﬁrst focus on imperfect quantity coordination only in
the balancing stage, assuming that operators fully cooperate in
the day-ahead stage, similarly to the existing IEM organization
where all regions have access to a common system-wide pool
of generation resources. Mathematically, this is implemented
by replacing constraints (1c)–(1d) by (4a)–(4b), where the
day-ahead dispatch variables for conventional and wind power
units are now augmented with the superscript ‘ ’ to denote the
decisions of the corresponding operator. Note that in principle
these are shared constraints between all operators. However,
the establishment of a common day-ahead market implies
that there exists only a single price for each resource, i.e., the
corresponding dual variables are equal for every operator.
(4a)
(4b)
Similarly, if the stochastic integrated market is employed, con-
straint (4b) replaces (3c) and thus its right-hand side is set equal
to .
On the other hand, we assume a completely segmented
balancing market where each operator has no access to
cross-border resources during real-time operation. From a
modeling perspective, this setup requires the replacement of
reserve deployment constraints (2c)–(2d) by (5a)–(5b), which
are however included only in the optimization problem of the
operator who controls the region where the corresponding
resource is located. Hence, these are not shared constraints,
even though they include day-ahead dispatch decisions from
other regional operators, and thus there exists per se a single
vector of dual variables. A similar logic applies for the rest
of re-dispatch actions which are solely performed by each
regional operator, i.e., constraints (2e)–(2h). Observe that this
set of constraints' substitution applies both to the sequential and
the stochastic integrated market-clearing models.
(5a)
(5b)
Extending our framework into the concept of partial price
coordination, we consider an incomplete market of transmis-
sion resources during balancing operation. This organizational
arrangement implies that each operator is responsible to main-
tain the real-time power balance only in its internal network,
while it has no information on the domestic grid of the neigh-
boring regions, i.e., there is no market of internal transmission
resources. Nonetheless, adjacent power systems still interact via
the shared power ﬂow constraints of the tie-lines which are in-
ﬂuenced by the re-dispatch actions in both regions due to the
underlying network topology. Hence, the transmission capacity
constraints of an interconnection , similar to (2i), are in-
cluded in the optimization problems of both operators and
who control the respective sending and receiving ends. As a re-
sult, there exist two distinct dual variables and ,
reﬂecting the marginal valuation of each operator, which in the
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absence of a trading mechanism may not converge to a single
price. In fact, this absence of a unique price for the linking con-
straints indicates an incomplete market of common resources
and yields an under-determined system. The reason is that each
player's strategic decisions inﬂuence the optimal choices of the
rivals and thus the right-hand side of the shared constraints; con-
sequently, the initial strategy has to be revised. This mathemat-
ically translates into a non-square system with more variables
than equations, given that each shared constraint is complemen-
tary to two dual variables.
In order to obtain a well-deﬁned model, [29] suggests to ex-
ogenously impose identical dual variables of the linking con-
straints for all players. In turn, this reduces the original GNE
to a Nash equilibrium (NE) which can be modeled as a VI
problem and reformulated as an equivalent MCP, which can
be readily solved. However, this numerical approach introduces
an implicit coordination structure akin to a marketplace where
all agents can trade their shared constraints at a common price.
Considering though that we are mainly interested to model the
lack of arbitrage opportunities in an incomplete market, we em-
ploy an alternative technique referred as normalized equilibrium
[23]; that is, the dual variables of the shared constraints for dif-
ferent agents follow a predetermined linear relationship that im-
poses their proportional variation. This exogenous relationship
reduces the degrees of freedom of the system but it prevents
them from converging on the same price. A normalized equilib-
rium point for the tie-line capacity constraints (2i) is deﬁned as:
(6)
where denotes the element-by-element multiplication. The en-
tries of matrix reﬂect the relative valuation of each line
by the regional operator with respect to a common dual
variable . Hence, an instance of equal elements for
every operator indicates a complete market for congestion on
line or a case of partial price coordination otherwise.
This method allows us to investigate distinct preferences of
individual players on common resources, e.g., tie-line capacity.
These preferences are expressed through the corresponding
value of the parameter , which reﬂects the perception of
operator for the value of tie-line . For instance, the op-
erator of a poorly interconnected power system may rely more
on a speciﬁc tie-line to ensure adequate balancing resources
than the neighboring operator who is well interconnected with
several other regions. Here, it should be emphasized that this
mathematical implementation allows us to obtain some of
the possibly multiple equilibria and does not guarantee ex-
haustive enumeration of all equilibrium points that may exist.
Nonetheless, the focus of this work is mainly on the practical
implications of incomplete markets as a form of imperfect
coordination.
D. Operating Reserves (OR)
The stochastic integrated market of model (3) is an en-
ergy-only auction, since operational cost is proportional only
to the amount of energy (day-ahead schedule and re-dispatch
actions) actually delivered to the network. However, this
mechanism can incorporate an additional capacity component,
similar to the operating reserve markets, in order to simulate a
regional electricity market that optimally draws local capacity
resources from the common day-ahead pool according to the
potential balancing needs to hedge against optimization errors
[30]. To improve clarity, we underline the difference between
operating reserves and regulation services (see also [9] and
[10]). The former term refers to the procurement of reserve ca-
pacity which, in turn, is excluded from energy provision in the
day-ahead market. On the other hand, regulation services relate
to the actual deployment of operating reserves during real-time
operation. These re-dispatch actions modify the day-ahead
production/consumption schedule of the generators/loads and
thus, provide an energy service to the system.
With the introduction of the operating reserves mechanism,
the amount of capacity reserved in each regional market be-
comes an additional strategic decision variable of the corre-
sponding operator, denoted by and for up and down re-
serve capacity, respectively. For this purpose, we add the day-
ahead constraints (7a)–(7b) that bound the upward and down-
ward reserve provision to the respective capacity offer and con-
straints (7c)–(7d) that deﬁne the complementary relationship of
energy and reserve services.
(7a)
(7b)
(7c)
(7d)
In the balancing counterpart, constraints (2c)–(2d) are removed,
since they now become redundant, and constraints (2e)–(2f) are
replaced by
(8a)
(8b)
Following a similar process, operating reserves can be inte-
grated also in the sequential market-clearing model (1)–(2).
However, this would require the deﬁnition of explicit reserve
requirements, which is beyond the scope of this paper. In
addition, we would like to underline that operating reserves are
not perceived here as a tradable product with explicit reserve
capacity costs, but as a tool to indicate divergent policies for
sharing internal balancing resources. Nonetheless, ﬂexible
generators are allowed to submit regulation offers with price
premiums that compensate the opportunity costs of the power
capacity withdrawn from the day-ahead dispatch, following the
approach of [9].
IV. CASE STUDY
The main purpose of this section is to provide some qual-
itative insights regarding the effect of imperfect coordination
between neighboring power systems. To this aim, we consider
the three distinct organizational setups presented in Fig. 2, with
varying degrees of coordination and/or market architecture. The
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Fig. 2. Schematic representation of organizational setups with different market
designs and degrees of coordination.
TABLE I
MODEL DEFINITION FOR ORGANIZATIONAL SETUPS
Fig. 3. Six-node power system.
model deﬁnition and the market architecture for each setup are
summarized in Table I.
We consider the six-bus system depicted in Fig. 3 which com-
prises two regions. The transmission capacities and the reac-
tances of all domestic lines are equal to 0.13 p.u. and 100 MW,
respectively. The corresponding values for the tie-lines con-
necting region I to region II, are equal to 0.20 p.u. and 15 MW.
Each region includes both ﬂexible and inﬂexible conventional
generators (G1 to G6) and one wind power plant (WP) is located
at node 1. The stochastic wind power generation is modeled
using two scenarios, namely high ( : 50 MW) and low ( :
10 MW), with a probability of occurrence 0.6 and 0.4, respec-
tively. The quantity and the price offers of conventional units for
the day-ahead and balancing markets are provided in Table II.
In addition, two inelastic loads (D3 and D6) of 170 MW and
190 MW, placed at nodes 3 and 6, can be partially curtailed at a
cost, , of $200/MWh.
Setup 1: For our analysis, Setup 1 corresponds to perfect co-
ordination both in the inter- and intra-regional domains. Here,
both operators employ the stochastic integrated market design
and fully cooperate in order to ensure system-wide network fea-
sibility both in day-ahead and real-time operation with full ac-
TABLE II
GENERATOR DATA
cess to all cross-border resources. Mathematically, this organi-
zational model is cast as a single optimization problem solved
by a central entity aiming to minimize the total expected system
cost. The optimal day-ahead schedule and the deployed reserves
are shown in Table III, where it can be observed that wind power
dispatch is equal to the low scenario. Conventional units G2, G3
and G4 are dispatched at full capacity while units G1 and G6 are
in partial load due to anticipated real-time network congestion
in the tie-line (3-6) if the high scenario materializes. However,
unit G5 is scheduled at 40 MW in the day-ahead stage, despite
its high operational cost, to enable 40 MW of down-regulation
and accommodate the excess wind power production in scenario
high.
Setup 2: This is a decentralized organizational model where
the two regional operators fully coordinate on their day-ahead
decisions, but there are various sources of imperfect real-time
coordination. Both regional markets are cleared following the
stochastic integrated market paradigm. From a mathematical
viewpoint, this setup is formulated as a stochastic MCP where
each operator's optimization problem, is represented by the cor-
respondingKKT conditions. In particular, Setup 2A assumes im-
perfect inter-regional coordination in real-time in terms of: i) no
access to cross-border balancing resources and ii) no informa-
tion about the domestic network of the neighboring regions, i.e.,
each operator is responsible only for its internal network feasi-
bility. According to the results presented in Table III, the main
differences compared to Setup 1 are found on the wind power
schedule, which is now equal to the high scenario, and on the
dispatch of unit G5, which is zero since no down-regulation is
needed in this case. The deviation from the optimal dispatch is
due to the limited information of operator II regarding the im-
pact of scheduling the wind farm at full capacity, on the bal-
ancing operation of region I. This decision decreases the day-
ahead cost but in turn it deteriorates the social welfare, since
the system has to resort to very costly load shedding if scenario
low occurs in order to cover the deﬁcit of 40 MW, given that
only 20 MW of up-regulation are available from unit G5. The
latter is also a consequence of imperfect inter-regional coordina-
tion since any other source of ﬂexibility is depleted already from
the day-ahead stage, considering that ﬂexible units G2 and G4
are now fully dispatched from operator II through the common
day-ahead pool. However, it should be noted that operator II
still has to bear some balancing costs, i.e., up-regulation of unit
G5 and load shedding at node 6, due to the physical intercon-
nections, despite that the imbalance occurs solely within the in-
ternal network of region I.
Aiming to improve the efﬁciency of the previous market ar-
rangement, we consider Setup 2B where we additionally intro-
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TABLE III
MARKET OUTCOMES FOR DIFFERENT ORGANIZATIONAL SETUPS
duce operating reserves. The corresponding results shown in
Table III indicate the value of this new strategic decision vari-
able, as reﬂected in the notable reduction of the total expected
cost, which now becomes fairly similar to the optimal bench-
mark. Compared to the previous arrangement and despite that
wind power schedule is still equal to the high scenario, operator
I is now able to withdraw 20MW of unit G2 from the day-ahead
pool to be deployed as up-regulation in the low scenario, as it
can anticipate the source of the imbalance. Nonetheless, this al-
ternative schedule eliminates the need for load shedding for any
realization of the uncertainty. Given that both operators employ
the stochastic integrated market-clearing, operator II infers im-
plicitly the imbalance in region I thought the physical intercon-
nection and consequently reserves 20 MW from unit G5.
The previous versions of Setup 2 considered a complete
market of interconnection capacities where both operators
assigned the same value in these resources, i.e., the value of
parameter for every tie-line in (6) is identical for
both operators. In Setup 2C we explore different equilibria in
case of an incomplete transmission market and no operating
reserves. Table III summarizes the results, separated by a slash,
in cases of: i) - and ii) - ,
where operator I evaluates higher either the capacity of in-
terconnection (3,6) or (2,4), respectively. Considering these
two normalized equilibrium points, it becomes apparent that
in the absence of an organized market for the interconnection
capacity, the power system operation becomes completely
unpredictable. In that case, the market may reach different
equilibria, with either higher or lower total cost compared to a
complete market (Setup 2A), but certainly more expensive than
the arrangement of perfect coordination (Setup 1). It should be
noted that different combinations of the parameter were
evaluated during the solution procedure. For certain values of
, the market equilibrium remains unchanged (equal to setup
2A) while other values of may lead to infeasibility (no
market equilibrium), which emphasizes further the necessity
of price coordination. Here, we follow a heuristic approach
to identify a solution that highlights the implications of trans-
mission market incompleteness, while other equilibria with
analogous properties may also exist.
Setup 3: Unlike the previous setups where both regional
markets accomplish perfect intra-regional coordination, Setup
3 models the interaction among variant market structures.
The day-ahead settlement in region I is performed based on
the ‘smart’ stochastic integrated market whereas region II
employs the ‘naive’ sequential market-clearing model that
prevents any temporal coordination between day-ahead and
balancing operations. The mathematical model of this setup
involves two distinct stages that pertain to the day-ahead and
balancing operation, respectively. The ﬁrst stage (St1) solves
the stochastic MCP which comprises the KKT conditions of
the stochastic integrated market with operating reserves and
the sequential design in regions I and II, respectively, assuming
that operator II does not undertake any balancing action. The
second stage (St2) ﬁnds the real-time equilibrium for every
uncertainty realization solving a deterministic MCP, where
the day-ahead schedule is an input parameter and only the
re-dispatch actions are considered as variables. Both stages
assume complete sharing of day-ahead resources but no access
to cross-border balancing services, while each regional operator
is solely responsible for the feasibility of its internal network
in real-time. Considering the results shown in Table III, it is
interesting to underline that wind power is now scheduled at its
expected production (34 MW), equal to the upper bound used in
the sequential market-clearing of region II. Moreover, operator
I who can still foresee the potential imbalances, acts proactively
and procures 20 MW and 16 MW of up- and down-regulation
respectively from unit G2, while the rest of the conventional
generators follow the merit-order. Nonetheless, if the low
scenario materializes, unit G2 will increase its production by
20 MW but still both regions will have to curtail a fraction
of their demand, summing up to 4 MW, in order to maintain
system balance since no additional up-regulation reserves are
available.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper provides a methodological framework to study
different market designs with varying degrees of coordina-
tion both in the inter- and intra-regional domains. The setups
of imperfect coordination, cast as generalized Nash equilib-
rium models, are numerically solved as stochastic MCP. The
analysis performed on a stylized electricity system indicates
signiﬁcant reduction of the social welfare in case of imperfect
quantity and transmission coordination, compared to an optimal
spatio-temporally integrated benchmark. An effective remedy
to restore market efﬁciency is an operating reserve mechanism
that enables hedging against real-time market imperfections.
Contrariwise, an incomplete market for the interconnection
capacity yields equilibria that not only have higher cost than
the optimal benchmark but are also very susceptible to the
relative valuation of the tie-lines from each operator. Finally,
it is shown that different market designs can coexist between
adjacent regions but at the expense of increased operational
cost, which underlines the need for harmonization towards an
integrated European balancing market.
Future work will focus on the development of novel solution
algorithms to reduce the computational burden of the proposed
methodological framework. This will enable its application to
real-world test cases with a large set of generation units, the de-
tailed network representation as well as the accurate modeling
of the uncertainty with an increased number of scenarios over
multiple locations. Furthermore, the model can be extended to
a multi-period network-constrained electricity pool to include
ramping limits or other relevant time-coupling constraints, e.g.,
energy storage capacities. Finally, the assumption of perfect pre-
dictive densities of stochastic power generation can be relaxed
in order to evaluate the effect of inaccurate forecast information
on the market outcome.
APPENDIX
The complete set of KKT conditions used in the mixed
complementarity problem of the stochastic integrated market
without operating reserves is provided in model (9). The op-
timality conditions for the sequential market-clearing can be
derived by removing the constraints and the corresponding dual
variables that do not appear in formulation (1)–(2).
(9a)
(9b)
(9c)
(9d)
(9e)
(9f)
(9g)
(9h)
(9i)
(9j)
(9k)
(9l)
(9m)
(9n)
(9o)
(9p)
(9q)
(9r)
(9s)
If the operating reserves mechanism is included in the
stochastic integrated market, based on the notation of
Section III-D, the set of KKT conditions writes as:
(10a)
(10b)
(10c)
(10d)
(10e)
(10f)
(10g)
(10h)
(10i)
(10j)
(10k)
(10l)
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Impact of Inter- and Intra-Regional Coordination in
Markets With a Large Renewable Component
Stefanos Delikaraoglou, Student Member, IEEE, Juan M. Morales, Member, IEEE, and
Pierre Pinson, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—The establishment of the single European day-ahead
market has accomplished a crucial step towards the spatial inte-
gration of the European power system. However, this new arrange-
ment does not consider any intra-regional coordination of day-
ahead and balancing markets and thus may become counterpro-
ductive or inefﬁcient under uncertain supply, e.g., from weather-
driven renewable power generation. In the absence of a speciﬁc
target model for the common balancing market in Europe, we in-
troduce a framework to compare different coordination schemes
andmarket organizations. The proposed models are formulated as
stochastic equilibrium problems and compared against an optimal
market setup. The simulation results reveal signiﬁcant efﬁciency
loss in case of partial coordination and diversity of market struc-
ture among regional power systems.
Index Terms—Market coupling, TSO coordination, stochastic
complementarity models, generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE),
electricity markets.
NOTATION
A. Indices and sets:
Set of regions
Set of system buses
Set of dispatchable units
Set of wind power units
Set of transmission lines
Set of wind power scenarios
Set of dispatchable units located at bus
Set of wind power units located at bus
Set of buses located in region
Set of dispatchable units located in region
B. Parameters:
Demand at node [MW]
Day-ahead offer price of unit [$/MWh]
Manuscript received September 14, 2015; revised January 02, 2016; ac-
cepted February 03, 2016. The work of S. Delikaraoglou was supported by
Energinet.dk in support of ERA-Net SmartGrids through project BPES-Bal-
ancing Power in the European System (No. 2010-1-10816). The work of J. M.
Morales and P. Pinson was supported in part by the Danish Strategic Council
for Strategic Research through the project 5s—Future Electricity Markets (no.
12-132636/DSF). Paper no. TPWRS-01302-2015.
S. Delikaraoglou and P. Pinson are with the Department of Electrical En-
gineering, Technical University of Denmark, Lyngby 2800, Denmark (e-mail:
stde@dtu.dk; ppin@dtu.dk).
J. M. Morales is with the Department of Applied Mathematics and Computer
Science, Technical University, Lyngby 2800, Denmark (e-mail: jmmgo@dtu.
dk).
Up regulation offer price of unit [$/MWh]
Down regulation offer price of unit [$/MWh]
Value of involuntarily shed load [$/MWh]
Capacity of dispatchable unit [MW]
Capacity of wind power unit [MW]
Forecast mean of wind power production [MW]
Wind power realization in scenario [MW]
Probability of occurrence of scenario
Maximum up regulation provided by unit [MW]
Maximum down regulation provided by unit
[MW]
Maximum capacity of line [MW]
Absolute value of the susceptance of line
[p.u.]
Relative valuation of line by operator
C. Variables:
Voltage angle at node at the day-ahead stage [rad]
Voltage angle at node in scenario [rad]
Day-ahead schedule of dispatchable unit [MW]
Day-ahead schedule of wind power unit [MW]
Up reserve capacity scheduled for unit [MW]
Down reserve capacity scheduled for unit [MW]
Up regulation provided by unit in scenario
[MW]
Down regulation provided by unit in scenario
[MW]
Wind power spilled by unit in scenario [MW]
Load shedding at node in scenario [MW]
Variables augmented with the superscript represent the deci-
sions of the operator in charge of the corresponding region. The
symbols denote the valuation of the arbitrary resource
by operators A and B, respectively. Similarly, denote
the subset of system resources located in the corresponding re-
gions A and B.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE last years have seen a substantial restructuring ofthe European power system regarding both the genera-
tion portfolio and the market architecture. Renewable energy
sources (RES) have gained a leading role on the supply-side,
Digital Object Identiﬁer 10.1109/TPWRS.2016.2530981
0885-8950 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
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while the establishment of the Internal Electricity Market
(IEM) pursued the spatial integration of the regional day-ahead
markets. This inter-regional integration of day-ahead markets
has enabled access to a larger pool of generating resources and
exploits the arbitrage opportunities over the European network
to optimize social welfare through enhanced cross-border
competition and improved market liquidity. According to
the ‘Target Model’ for the European market integration,
day-ahead clearing follows a zonal pricing scheme, where
transmission capacity among zones is calculated according to
either ﬂow-based methods in case of highly meshed grids and
strong interdependencies between the interconnections or the
Available Transfer Capacity (ATC) approach for less meshed
networks [1]. This reduced grid representation, where internal
network is treated as a copper plate, may result into infeasible
real-time power ﬂows due to transmission congestion. Never-
theless, recent literature [2], [3] proposes alternative approaches
to account also for the intra-zonal network feasibility, based on
a centralized market-splitting algorithm that integrates diverse
market designs, i.e., power pools or power exchanges.
Despite the spatial coupling of day-ahead markets operated
by power exchanges, balancing operation remains still a respon-
sibility of regional Transmission System Operators (TSOs).
During real-time operation, TSOs must take corrective actions
to guarantee network feasibility and cover any imbalances from
the initial schedule. This geographically segmented design
hinders access to cheaper cross-border balancing resources
and thus it aggravates the scope for exercising market power
in cases of low market liquidity. Moreover, internal balancing
resources might be over-utilized since some potential gains
from reduced prediction errors due to spatial smoothing effects
of stochastic in-feed are not leveraged. In this respect, [4]
shows that the integration of the Nordic and German balancing
markets can reduce annual costs up to €400 million, while [5]
estimates a reduction of balancing costs up to 50% from the
establishment of a common merit-order list between the Dutch,
German and Nordic markets. In addition, [6] reports 40% less
re-dispatch in the integrated Northern European power market
in case of system-wide regulating reserve procurement as well
as 25% reduction in reserves activation due to system-wide
netting of imbalances. A similar analysis is performed in [7],
showing a potential cost reduction of 40% by the implementa-
tion of a cross-border balancing mechanism between Belgium
and the Netherlands. On the European level, [8] estimates the
beneﬁts from balancing market integration to €1.3 billion per
year due to potential imbalance netting and exchange of lower
cost balancing power.
Apart from the limited coordination in space, the sequential
operation of the current market architecture does not allow
for any inter-temporal hedging to deal with the increasing
uncertainty of variable and partially predictable RES, e.g.,
wind power, resulting in diminished overall market efﬁ-
ciency. In order to enable the coupling of day-ahead and
balancing market stages, recent research [9]–[12] focuses
on market-clearing models that jointly optimize day-ahead
dispatch and real-time reserve deployment within a stochastic
programming framework. This integrated approach is able to
capture the dependency of balancing actions on day-ahead
decisions and thus reduce total operating costs.
Nonetheless, the implementation of an ideal market design,
which integrates energy and transmission both in time and
space, requires a pan-European market operator/TSO that has
full information on the spatio-temporal structure of forecast
errors and a complete overview of the system. However, re-
gional TSOs are hesitant to forfeit some of their autonomy to
a central authority given the signiﬁcant differences that exist
in balancing operations, control concepts and local resources.
In the absence of a speciﬁc target model for the integration
of regional balancing markets, different market arrangements
with varying levels of harmonization and coordination between
TSOs may arise before the establishment of a pan-European
balancing market [13]. A comprehensive study on the different
design elements in six short-term, i.e., intraday and real-time,
European power markets is presented in [14]. In this regard,
generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) problems provide a nat-
ural framework to model the interaction of players that share
a common strategy set. For instance, [15] formulates a GNE
model to study different degrees of coordination in congestion
management among neighboring TSOs. This model is applied
on an illustrative power system in [16], [17] showing the
detrimental effects of partial coordination and market incom-
pleteness on re-dispatching costs, while [18] follows a similar
approach to study the effect of imperfect coordination among
the four German TSOs which results in expensive remedial
actions.
This paper aims at appraising the beneﬁts from the
spatio-temporal coupling of the European electricity markets
compared to plausible decentralized organizations with imper-
fect coordination among neighboring regions. In this regard, we
provide a methodological framework to model varying levels
of coordination both in space and in time based on a stochastic
mixed complementarity problem (MCP) formulation. The pro-
posed framework can accommodate several features of possible
market arrangements such as limited access to cross-border
balancing resources and different valuation of the shared trans-
mission capacity. In light of an inefﬁcient energy-only market
in case of partial coordination, we propose a remedial reserve
capacity mechanism that brings the market outcome close to
the ideal setup of full coordination.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II de-
scribes the different degrees of intra- and inter-regional coor-
dination and their modeling approach from an economic and
mathematical perspective, while the detailed model formulation
is provided in Section III. Section IV presents and discusses re-
sults of an illustrative case study performed on a stylized six-bus
electricity system. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. BASIC COORDINATION CONCEPTS
In this work, we study the impact of different degrees of co-
ordination both in time (intra-regional) and in space (inter-re-
gional) domains, as shown in Fig. 1.
On the temporal dimension ofmarket operation, wemodel the
extreme cases of imperfect and full intra-regional coordination
by employing a sequential and a stochastic integrated market-
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Fig. 1. Intra- and inter-regional coordination arrangements. DA: Day-ahead
market. BA: Balancing market.
clearing approach, respectively. The sequential setup resembles
the existing European market architecture, where a day-ahead
auction takes place 12–36 hours prior to actual energy delivery
to produce an initial schedule for generation and consumption
levels. To cope with any real-time energy imbalances, an in-
dependent balancing market is organized for the activation of
regulating power. This mechanism perceives a completely de-
terministic view of the uncertainties involved in power system
operation, e.g., stochastic wind power generation, and thus it
prevents any intra-regional coordination between the day-ahead
and balancing trading ﬂoors. On the contrary, a market-clearing
model which co-optimizes the energy dispatch and the antici-
pated reserve deployment with a fully probabilistic view of un-
certainty, attains perfect intra-regional coordination. Nonethe-
less, this market setup suffers from a fundamental design ﬂaw:
marginal prices do not always guarantee cost recovery for ﬂex-
ible producers [10], [19]. Hence, the application of this market
architecture here is purely instrumental and used only for the
deﬁnition of an optimal benchmark for intra-regional coordina-
tion.
In the inter-regional domain, full spatial coordination is
achieved when regional operators1 cooperate to jointly optimize
their systems, offering all their resources in a common pool
and exchanging complete information about their domestic
network. On the other hand, imperfect coordination between
multiple operators may arise in form of partial quantity or price
coordination. Partial quantity coordination emerges in case
of a segmented market of cross-border resources, i.e., when
some internal resources are excluded from the common pool,
as shown in Fig. 1, where only a subset of resources is
offered in the common market, e.g., due to different reliability
criteria. Throughout this work, we consider that all system
resources are accessible from all regional operators during the
day-ahead stage, following the paradigm of the European In-
ternal Electricity Market. On the contrary, we apply the concept
of partial quantity coordination on the balancing stage, where
each operator can access only the subset of system resources
that are physically located in its region.
1We couple the entities of market operator and TSO under the term ‘operator’,
despite their distinguished scope pertaining to the day-ahead and balancing mar-
kets, respectively.
Another source of imperfect coordination is market incom-
pleteness [20]. A complete market suggests that all constraints
are traded at a single price which reﬂects the common valua-
tion of each product from all agents. However, in case of partial
price coordination (or a completely missing market for some
services), agents with different willingness to pay for a certain
resource face a price gap due to lack of arbitrage opportunities
that prevent price convergence [21]. For example, in Fig. 1 the
arbitrary resource (e.g., a transmission line or generation ca-
pacity) is valued at different prices from each oper-
ator. This leads to a Pareto-inefﬁcient resource allocation since
all agents could improve their payoff by jointly optimizing their
decisions [22].
From an economic perspective, imperfect coordination
among various players relates to the notion of GNE. This is
the equilibrium of a non-cooperative game where both the
payoff and the set of each player's constraints depends on rival
players' actions. In the context of power systems, operators
in adjacent regions interact on their strategy sets through the
shared physical constraints imposed by the underlying network
and the limits of the available resources.
From a mathematical viewpoint, a GNE problem leads to a
Quasi-Variational Inequality (QVI) model which, in the general
case, admits multiple solutions that arise from different valu-
ation of the shared constraints, i.e., each agent may have dif-
ferent dual variables for each shared constraint. In order to ob-
tain a numerically tractable solution, the original QVI problem
is reduced to a Variational Inequality (VI) problem, using the
solution concept of normalized equilibrium [23]. Finally, this
VI problem can be recast as an equivalent MCP as described in
Section III.
Similar methods to explore the multiple solutions to QVI
problems are proposed in [24], whereas [25] formulates an it-
erative algorithm based on disjunctive constraints to identify
different equilibria, at the expense, though, of higher computa-
tional cost. The normalized equilibrium technique is also used in
[26] to analyze cooperative game theory in the context of elec-
tricity markets as well as in [27] for the analysis of renewable
portfolio standards in the presence of coupling regulatory con-
straints among different electricity producers.
III. MODELING INTRA- AND INTER-REGIONAL COORDINATION
A. Assumptions
The mathematical formulation of market-clearing models
(1)–(2) and (3) build on the following set of assumptions.
1) The only source of uncertainty considered is stochastic
wind power generation while system load and ‘ﬁrm’ re-
source availability can be perfectly forecast. However, ad-
ditional uncertainties such as demand variations or equip-
ment failures can be integrated in the market-clearing in a
similar way.
2) Stochastic wind power production is modeled by a ﬁnite
set of scenarios. This probabilistic information is centrally
obtained by the operator to capture the spatial dependence
structure of the forecast errors. In addition, we assume ac-
cess to the correct description of the predictive densities
of stochastic power production, i.e., there is no mismatch
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between the ‘estimated’ and the ‘realized’ distributions of
wind energy generation. We leave the topic of forecast im-
perfection for future research.
3) Demand-side is assumed to be completely inelastic, with
a sufﬁciently large value of lost load. Hence, the social
welfare maximization is equivalent to minimization of the
power system operational cost.
4) The day-ahead market is settled on independent hourly
single-period auctions and thus no inter-temporal con-
straints, e.g., ramping rates, are taken into account.
Nonetheless, ramping constraints can be incorporated
in the proposed framework, extending the formulation
to a multi-period setup. In addition, no intra-day energy
trading is considered, justiﬁed by the low liquidity of these
markets [28].
5) The transmission network is modeled with a lossless DC
approximation.
6) Assuming null power production costs, the price offer and
the spillage cost of wind power is set equal to zero.
7) In accordance with the European market paradigm,
conventional generators internalize any discrete on-off
commitment decisions and we further assume that they
offer their full capacity into the market with linear cost
functions. This preserves the linear and convex formula-
tion of the market-clearing models and permits to integrate
the market-clearing models in a complementarity problem
through their Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions.
In the subsequent formulations, the vector of dual variables
associated with each set of constraints is indicated after a colon.
For the sake of clarity, we use the symbols and , with ap-
propriate indices, to denote the duals of inequality and equality
constraints, respectively.
B. Intra-Regional Coordination
1) Sequential Market (SeqM): The sequential market setup
comprises the day-ahead and balancing trading ﬂoors which are
cleared independently by solving models (1) and (2), respec-
tively. The operator determines the optimal day-ahead dispatch
through the following optimization problem.
Ξ
(1a)
(1b)
(1c)
(1d)
(1e)
(1f)
(1g)
where Ξ is the set of primal opti-
mization variables of the day-ahead market-clearing problem.
The objective function (1a) represents the day-ahead cost of
power system operation to be minimized. The equality con-
straint (1b) enforces the power balance at every node of the
system. Constraints (1c) represent the capacity limits of conven-
tional generators, while constraints (1d) set the upper bound to
wind power dispatch equal to the conditional expectation of the
wind power stochastic process. The power ﬂows over the net-
work are restricted by the transmission capacity limits in (1e)
and equation (1f) ﬁxes the voltage angle at the reference node
equal to zero. Finally, constraints (1g) are variable declarations.
In real-time operation, when the uncertainty realization
is known, any deviations from the day-ahead schedule have to
be balanced by appropriate re-dispatch actions given as the so-
lution of the following optimization problem.
Ξ
(2a)
(2b)
(2c)
(2d)
(2e)
(2f)
(2g)
(2h)
(2i)
(2j)
(2k)
where Ξ is
the set of primal optimization variables of the balancing market-
clearing problem. Notice that all the day-ahead variables enter
the problem as parameters. The re-dispatch actions, i.e., up- and
down-regulation, wind spillage and load shedding constitute the
set of available regulation services. The objective function (2a)
to be minimized is the cost of re-dispatch actions in order to
re-establish the nodal power balance enforced by constraints
(2b). Constraints (2c) and (2d) bind the up and down reserve ac-
tivation from every conventional unit according to its capacity
and the day-ahead dispatch, while constraints (2e) and (2f) en-
force the corresponding offer limits speciﬁed by each generator
for up- and down-regulation, respectively. Similarly, the re-dis-
patch actions of wind spillage and load shedding are bounded by
the actual wind power production and the nodal demand through
(2g) and (2h), respectively. Constraints (2i) guarantee the net-
work feasibility after the deployment of reserves and equation
(2j) ﬁxes the voltage angle of the reference node to zero. The
variable declarations of model (2) are included in the set of con-
straints (2k).
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2) Stochastic Integrated Market (StochM): The stochastic
integrated market is formulated as a two-stage stochastic pro-
gramming problem (3) in which day-ahead dispatch decisions
anticipate the balancing recourse actions over a plausible range
of uncertainty. For the sake of brevity, we present a compact
formulation of model (3) emphasizing its main differences com-
pared to the sequential approach.
Ξ
(3a)
(3b)
(3c)
(3d)
where Ξ
is the set of primal optimization variables
of the stochastic integrated market model. Unlike the conven-
tional dispatch model (1)–(2), which separates completely the
day-ahead and balancing operations, the stochastic integrated
market accounts for the interaction of these stages through the
expectation of the balancing costs in the objective function (3a)
and the real-time constraints (3d). Notice that real-time con-
straints are formulated for all , whereas the day-ahead dis-
patch decisions enter the set of (3d) as variables instead of ﬁxed
parameters. This implicit link between the two stages permits to
pre-position, even out of merit-order, the ﬂexible resources in a
way that improves the overall response to variations and un-
certainty of stochastic generation. Moreover, observe that, the
day-ahead dispatch of stochastic generation may take values
within the whole interval of the installed capacity (constraint
(3c)) depending on the structure of forecast errors and the asym-
metry of regulating costs.
C. Inter-Regional Coordination
To study different degrees of inter-regional coordination, we
consider a multi-regional power system where each region
is managed by an independent operator. In this setup, full co-
ordination is achieved when all operators cooperate in order to
minimize the total system cost by fully sharing the resources
and technical information of their jurisdiction both in the day-
ahead and real-time stages. In practice, this setup is equivalent
to a fully centralized organization where market-clearing is per-
formed by a single entity. However, a decentralized organiza-
tional structure, where each regional operator seeks to mini-
mize its own internal system cost, may not fulﬁll the prereq-
uisites of the above ideal paradigm. Following the discussion of
Section II, this operational scheme is modeled as a stochastic
MCP, where the KKT conditions for each operator's optimiza-
tion problem are simultaneously solved. This modeling frame-
work allows to consider regional operators that follow either
similar or different market designs, in particular the ‘naive’ se-
quential approach or the ‘smart’ stochastic integrated market-
clearing. The complete formulation of KKT optimality condi-
tions is provided in the Appendix.
We ﬁrst focus on imperfect quantity coordination only in
the balancing stage, assuming that operators fully cooperate in
the day-ahead stage, similarly to the existing IEM organization
where all regions have access to a common system-wide pool
of generation resources. Mathematically, this is implemented
by replacing constraints (1c)–(1d) by (4a)–(4b), where the
day-ahead dispatch variables for conventional and wind power
units are now augmented with the superscript ‘ ’ to denote the
decisions of the corresponding operator. Note that in principle
these are shared constraints between all operators. However,
the establishment of a common day-ahead market implies
that there exists only a single price for each resource, i.e., the
corresponding dual variables are equal for every operator.
(4a)
(4b)
Similarly, if the stochastic integrated market is employed, con-
straint (4b) replaces (3c) and thus its right-hand side is set equal
to .
On the other hand, we assume a completely segmented
balancing market where each operator has no access to
cross-border resources during real-time operation. From a
modeling perspective, this setup requires the replacement of
reserve deployment constraints (2c)–(2d) by (5a)–(5b), which
are however included only in the optimization problem of the
operator who controls the region where the corresponding
resource is located. Hence, these are not shared constraints,
even though they include day-ahead dispatch decisions from
other regional operators, and thus there exists per se a single
vector of dual variables. A similar logic applies for the rest
of re-dispatch actions which are solely performed by each
regional operator, i.e., constraints (2e)–(2h). Observe that this
set of constraints' substitution applies both to the sequential and
the stochastic integrated market-clearing models.
(5a)
(5b)
Extending our framework into the concept of partial price
coordination, we consider an incomplete market of transmis-
sion resources during balancing operation. This organizational
arrangement implies that each operator is responsible to main-
tain the real-time power balance only in its internal network,
while it has no information on the domestic grid of the neigh-
boring regions, i.e., there is no market of internal transmission
resources. Nonetheless, adjacent power systems still interact via
the shared power ﬂow constraints of the tie-lines which are in-
ﬂuenced by the re-dispatch actions in both regions due to the
underlying network topology. Hence, the transmission capacity
constraints of an interconnection , similar to (2i), are in-
cluded in the optimization problems of both operators and
who control the respective sending and receiving ends. As a re-
sult, there exist two distinct dual variables and ,
reﬂecting the marginal valuation of each operator, which in the
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absence of a trading mechanism may not converge to a single
price. In fact, this absence of a unique price for the linking con-
straints indicates an incomplete market of common resources
and yields an under-determined system. The reason is that each
player's strategic decisions inﬂuence the optimal choices of the
rivals and thus the right-hand side of the shared constraints; con-
sequently, the initial strategy has to be revised. This mathemat-
ically translates into a non-square system with more variables
than equations, given that each shared constraint is complemen-
tary to two dual variables.
In order to obtain a well-deﬁned model, [29] suggests to ex-
ogenously impose identical dual variables of the linking con-
straints for all players. In turn, this reduces the original GNE
to a Nash equilibrium (NE) which can be modeled as a VI
problem and reformulated as an equivalent MCP, which can
be readily solved. However, this numerical approach introduces
an implicit coordination structure akin to a marketplace where
all agents can trade their shared constraints at a common price.
Considering though that we are mainly interested to model the
lack of arbitrage opportunities in an incomplete market, we em-
ploy an alternative technique referred as normalized equilibrium
[23]; that is, the dual variables of the shared constraints for dif-
ferent agents follow a predetermined linear relationship that im-
poses their proportional variation. This exogenous relationship
reduces the degrees of freedom of the system but it prevents
them from converging on the same price. A normalized equilib-
rium point for the tie-line capacity constraints (2i) is deﬁned as:
(6)
where denotes the element-by-element multiplication. The en-
tries of matrix reﬂect the relative valuation of each line
by the regional operator with respect to a common dual
variable . Hence, an instance of equal elements for
every operator indicates a complete market for congestion on
line or a case of partial price coordination otherwise.
This method allows us to investigate distinct preferences of
individual players on common resources, e.g., tie-line capacity.
These preferences are expressed through the corresponding
value of the parameter , which reﬂects the perception of
operator for the value of tie-line . For instance, the op-
erator of a poorly interconnected power system may rely more
on a speciﬁc tie-line to ensure adequate balancing resources
than the neighboring operator who is well interconnected with
several other regions. Here, it should be emphasized that this
mathematical implementation allows us to obtain some of
the possibly multiple equilibria and does not guarantee ex-
haustive enumeration of all equilibrium points that may exist.
Nonetheless, the focus of this work is mainly on the practical
implications of incomplete markets as a form of imperfect
coordination.
D. Operating Reserves (OR)
The stochastic integrated market of model (3) is an en-
ergy-only auction, since operational cost is proportional only
to the amount of energy (day-ahead schedule and re-dispatch
actions) actually delivered to the network. However, this
mechanism can incorporate an additional capacity component,
similar to the operating reserve markets, in order to simulate a
regional electricity market that optimally draws local capacity
resources from the common day-ahead pool according to the
potential balancing needs to hedge against optimization errors
[30]. To improve clarity, we underline the difference between
operating reserves and regulation services (see also [9] and
[10]). The former term refers to the procurement of reserve ca-
pacity which, in turn, is excluded from energy provision in the
day-ahead market. On the other hand, regulation services relate
to the actual deployment of operating reserves during real-time
operation. These re-dispatch actions modify the day-ahead
production/consumption schedule of the generators/loads and
thus, provide an energy service to the system.
With the introduction of the operating reserves mechanism,
the amount of capacity reserved in each regional market be-
comes an additional strategic decision variable of the corre-
sponding operator, denoted by and for up and down re-
serve capacity, respectively. For this purpose, we add the day-
ahead constraints (7a)–(7b) that bound the upward and down-
ward reserve provision to the respective capacity offer and con-
straints (7c)–(7d) that deﬁne the complementary relationship of
energy and reserve services.
(7a)
(7b)
(7c)
(7d)
In the balancing counterpart, constraints (2c)–(2d) are removed,
since they now become redundant, and constraints (2e)–(2f) are
replaced by
(8a)
(8b)
Following a similar process, operating reserves can be inte-
grated also in the sequential market-clearing model (1)–(2).
However, this would require the deﬁnition of explicit reserve
requirements, which is beyond the scope of this paper. In
addition, we would like to underline that operating reserves are
not perceived here as a tradable product with explicit reserve
capacity costs, but as a tool to indicate divergent policies for
sharing internal balancing resources. Nonetheless, ﬂexible
generators are allowed to submit regulation offers with price
premiums that compensate the opportunity costs of the power
capacity withdrawn from the day-ahead dispatch, following the
approach of [9].
IV. CASE STUDY
The main purpose of this section is to provide some qual-
itative insights regarding the effect of imperfect coordination
between neighboring power systems. To this aim, we consider
the three distinct organizational setups presented in Fig. 2, with
varying degrees of coordination and/or market architecture. The
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Fig. 2. Schematic representation of organizational setups with different market
designs and degrees of coordination.
TABLE I
MODEL DEFINITION FOR ORGANIZATIONAL SETUPS
Fig. 3. Six-node power system.
model deﬁnition and the market architecture for each setup are
summarized in Table I.
We consider the six-bus system depicted in Fig. 3 which com-
prises two regions. The transmission capacities and the reac-
tances of all domestic lines are equal to 0.13 p.u. and 100 MW,
respectively. The corresponding values for the tie-lines con-
necting region I to region II, are equal to 0.20 p.u. and 15 MW.
Each region includes both ﬂexible and inﬂexible conventional
generators (G1 to G6) and one wind power plant (WP) is located
at node 1. The stochastic wind power generation is modeled
using two scenarios, namely high ( : 50 MW) and low ( :
10 MW), with a probability of occurrence 0.6 and 0.4, respec-
tively. The quantity and the price offers of conventional units for
the day-ahead and balancing markets are provided in Table II.
In addition, two inelastic loads (D3 and D6) of 170 MW and
190 MW, placed at nodes 3 and 6, can be partially curtailed at a
cost, , of $200/MWh.
Setup 1: For our analysis, Setup 1 corresponds to perfect co-
ordination both in the inter- and intra-regional domains. Here,
both operators employ the stochastic integrated market design
and fully cooperate in order to ensure system-wide network fea-
sibility both in day-ahead and real-time operation with full ac-
TABLE II
GENERATOR DATA
cess to all cross-border resources. Mathematically, this organi-
zational model is cast as a single optimization problem solved
by a central entity aiming to minimize the total expected system
cost. The optimal day-ahead schedule and the deployed reserves
are shown in Table III, where it can be observed that wind power
dispatch is equal to the low scenario. Conventional units G2, G3
and G4 are dispatched at full capacity while units G1 and G6 are
in partial load due to anticipated real-time network congestion
in the tie-line (3-6) if the high scenario materializes. However,
unit G5 is scheduled at 40 MW in the day-ahead stage, despite
its high operational cost, to enable 40 MW of down-regulation
and accommodate the excess wind power production in scenario
high.
Setup 2: This is a decentralized organizational model where
the two regional operators fully coordinate on their day-ahead
decisions, but there are various sources of imperfect real-time
coordination. Both regional markets are cleared following the
stochastic integrated market paradigm. From a mathematical
viewpoint, this setup is formulated as a stochastic MCP where
each operator's optimization problem, is represented by the cor-
respondingKKT conditions. In particular, Setup 2A assumes im-
perfect inter-regional coordination in real-time in terms of: i) no
access to cross-border balancing resources and ii) no informa-
tion about the domestic network of the neighboring regions, i.e.,
each operator is responsible only for its internal network feasi-
bility. According to the results presented in Table III, the main
differences compared to Setup 1 are found on the wind power
schedule, which is now equal to the high scenario, and on the
dispatch of unit G5, which is zero since no down-regulation is
needed in this case. The deviation from the optimal dispatch is
due to the limited information of operator II regarding the im-
pact of scheduling the wind farm at full capacity, on the bal-
ancing operation of region I. This decision decreases the day-
ahead cost but in turn it deteriorates the social welfare, since
the system has to resort to very costly load shedding if scenario
low occurs in order to cover the deﬁcit of 40 MW, given that
only 20 MW of up-regulation are available from unit G5. The
latter is also a consequence of imperfect inter-regional coordina-
tion since any other source of ﬂexibility is depleted already from
the day-ahead stage, considering that ﬂexible units G2 and G4
are now fully dispatched from operator II through the common
day-ahead pool. However, it should be noted that operator II
still has to bear some balancing costs, i.e., up-regulation of unit
G5 and load shedding at node 6, due to the physical intercon-
nections, despite that the imbalance occurs solely within the in-
ternal network of region I.
Aiming to improve the efﬁciency of the previous market ar-
rangement, we consider Setup 2B where we additionally intro-
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TABLE III
MARKET OUTCOMES FOR DIFFERENT ORGANIZATIONAL SETUPS
duce operating reserves. The corresponding results shown in
Table III indicate the value of this new strategic decision vari-
able, as reﬂected in the notable reduction of the total expected
cost, which now becomes fairly similar to the optimal bench-
mark. Compared to the previous arrangement and despite that
wind power schedule is still equal to the high scenario, operator
I is now able to withdraw 20MW of unit G2 from the day-ahead
pool to be deployed as up-regulation in the low scenario, as it
can anticipate the source of the imbalance. Nonetheless, this al-
ternative schedule eliminates the need for load shedding for any
realization of the uncertainty. Given that both operators employ
the stochastic integrated market-clearing, operator II infers im-
plicitly the imbalance in region I thought the physical intercon-
nection and consequently reserves 20 MW from unit G5.
The previous versions of Setup 2 considered a complete
market of interconnection capacities where both operators
assigned the same value in these resources, i.e., the value of
parameter for every tie-line in (6) is identical for
both operators. In Setup 2C we explore different equilibria in
case of an incomplete transmission market and no operating
reserves. Table III summarizes the results, separated by a slash,
in cases of: i) - and ii) - ,
where operator I evaluates higher either the capacity of in-
terconnection (3,6) or (2,4), respectively. Considering these
two normalized equilibrium points, it becomes apparent that
in the absence of an organized market for the interconnection
capacity, the power system operation becomes completely
unpredictable. In that case, the market may reach different
equilibria, with either higher or lower total cost compared to a
complete market (Setup 2A), but certainly more expensive than
the arrangement of perfect coordination (Setup 1). It should be
noted that different combinations of the parameter were
evaluated during the solution procedure. For certain values of
, the market equilibrium remains unchanged (equal to setup
2A) while other values of may lead to infeasibility (no
market equilibrium), which emphasizes further the necessity
of price coordination. Here, we follow a heuristic approach
to identify a solution that highlights the implications of trans-
mission market incompleteness, while other equilibria with
analogous properties may also exist.
Setup 3: Unlike the previous setups where both regional
markets accomplish perfect intra-regional coordination, Setup
3 models the interaction among variant market structures.
The day-ahead settlement in region I is performed based on
the ‘smart’ stochastic integrated market whereas region II
employs the ‘naive’ sequential market-clearing model that
prevents any temporal coordination between day-ahead and
balancing operations. The mathematical model of this setup
involves two distinct stages that pertain to the day-ahead and
balancing operation, respectively. The ﬁrst stage (St1) solves
the stochastic MCP which comprises the KKT conditions of
the stochastic integrated market with operating reserves and
the sequential design in regions I and II, respectively, assuming
that operator II does not undertake any balancing action. The
second stage (St2) ﬁnds the real-time equilibrium for every
uncertainty realization solving a deterministic MCP, where
the day-ahead schedule is an input parameter and only the
re-dispatch actions are considered as variables. Both stages
assume complete sharing of day-ahead resources but no access
to cross-border balancing services, while each regional operator
is solely responsible for the feasibility of its internal network
in real-time. Considering the results shown in Table III, it is
interesting to underline that wind power is now scheduled at its
expected production (34 MW), equal to the upper bound used in
the sequential market-clearing of region II. Moreover, operator
I who can still foresee the potential imbalances, acts proactively
and procures 20 MW and 16 MW of up- and down-regulation
respectively from unit G2, while the rest of the conventional
generators follow the merit-order. Nonetheless, if the low
scenario materializes, unit G2 will increase its production by
20 MW but still both regions will have to curtail a fraction
of their demand, summing up to 4 MW, in order to maintain
system balance since no additional up-regulation reserves are
available.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper provides a methodological framework to study
different market designs with varying degrees of coordina-
tion both in the inter- and intra-regional domains. The setups
of imperfect coordination, cast as generalized Nash equilib-
rium models, are numerically solved as stochastic MCP. The
analysis performed on a stylized electricity system indicates
signiﬁcant reduction of the social welfare in case of imperfect
quantity and transmission coordination, compared to an optimal
spatio-temporally integrated benchmark. An effective remedy
to restore market efﬁciency is an operating reserve mechanism
that enables hedging against real-time market imperfections.
Contrariwise, an incomplete market for the interconnection
capacity yields equilibria that not only have higher cost than
the optimal benchmark but are also very susceptible to the
relative valuation of the tie-lines from each operator. Finally,
it is shown that different market designs can coexist between
adjacent regions but at the expense of increased operational
cost, which underlines the need for harmonization towards an
integrated European balancing market.
Future work will focus on the development of novel solution
algorithms to reduce the computational burden of the proposed
methodological framework. This will enable its application to
real-world test cases with a large set of generation units, the de-
tailed network representation as well as the accurate modeling
of the uncertainty with an increased number of scenarios over
multiple locations. Furthermore, the model can be extended to
a multi-period network-constrained electricity pool to include
ramping limits or other relevant time-coupling constraints, e.g.,
energy storage capacities. Finally, the assumption of perfect pre-
dictive densities of stochastic power generation can be relaxed
in order to evaluate the effect of inaccurate forecast information
on the market outcome.
APPENDIX
The complete set of KKT conditions used in the mixed
complementarity problem of the stochastic integrated market
without operating reserves is provided in model (9). The op-
timality conditions for the sequential market-clearing can be
derived by removing the constraints and the corresponding dual
variables that do not appear in formulation (1)–(2).
(9a)
(9b)
(9c)
(9d)
(9e)
(9f)
(9g)
(9h)
(9i)
(9j)
(9k)
(9l)
(9m)
(9n)
(9o)
(9p)
(9q)
(9r)
(9s)
If the operating reserves mechanism is included in the
stochastic integrated market, based on the notation of
Section III-D, the set of KKT conditions writes as:
(10a)
(10b)
(10c)
(10d)
(10e)
(10f)
(10g)
(10h)
(10i)
(10j)
(10k)
(10l)
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